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ABSTRACT
On April 11, 1991, the Galileo spacecraft executed a sequence that would open the
spacecraft's High Gain Antenna. The antenna's launch restraint had been released just after
launch, but the antenna was left undeployed to protect it from the heat of the sun. During the
deployment sequence, the antenna, which opens like an umbrella, never reached the fully
deployed position. The analyses and tests that followed allowed a conclusive determination
of the likely failure mechanism and pointed to some strategies to use for recovery of the high
gain antenna.
INTRODUC_ON
The Galileo spacecraft's mission is to drop a probe (the Huygens Probe) into the
atmosphere of Jupiter and then tour the Jovian system for two years, gathering a wealth of
data on the system's structure, composition, and environments. The spacecraft was launched
from Kennedy Space Center aboard the Space Shuttle on October 18, 1989. Galileo's
trajectory carded it toward Venus for a gravity assist on February 10, 1990. The spacecraft
then flew by Earth for a second gravity assist on December 8, 1990, and it flew by Earth
again on December 8, 1992 for a third gravity assist. The spacecraft is currently on its way
toward a December 1995 arrival at Jupiter.
The Galileo spacecraft (Figure 1) is a spin stabilized spacecraft and has three Earth-to-
spacecraft communications antennas for commanding and returning spacecraft telemetry.
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to the sun, the High Gain Antenna (HGA) had to be protected from the direct sun. To do this,
a sunshade was put on the tip of the antenna structure and the antenna was left in the
undeployed position until April 1991 when the sun-to-spacecraft distance was large enough
to present no thermal danger to the HGA.
The Galileo High Gain Antenna is shown in Figure 2 in the stowed position, and Figure
3 shows the antenna in the deployed position. The HGA is deployed and stowed by a
mechanism located in the base of the antenna called the Mechanical Drive System (MDS).
This system consists of a Dual Drive Actuator Ill (DDA), a 0.5 inch (12.7 mm) diameter,
eight threads per inch (0.125 in, 3.175 mm pitch) ballscrew/ballnut assembly, a carrier
assembly, 18 pushrods, and 18 ribs. (Figure 4) The ribs have a gold-plated wire mesh
connected to them that stretches and forms the reflector surface when the antenna is fully
deployed. Figure 5 shows the Mechanical Drive System in the fully deployed position. The
lower end of the ballscrew is supported by a bearing housing containing a radial roller
bearing and two roller thrust bearings. As the ballscrew is turned by the DDA, the carrier,
which is prevented from rotating by the pushrods, moves toward the DDA. This motion
results in the pushrods forcing the ribs to rotate about their pivot point and open out like an
umbrella. The motion of the ribs pulls the wire mesh out and stretches it tight, creating the
reflector surface. The ribs open out until each rib fitting contacts a mechanical stop,
preventing any further deployment of the rib. The continued motion of the carrier
compresses a spring on each of the pushrods, preloading the ribs against their stops, and
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continues until the pushrods pass over center. This maintains a constant preload on the ribs
in the cleploy direction after the DDA is shut off at the fully deployed position.
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After launch, the Central Release Mechanism
(CRM) is actuatea, releasing all i8 spokes and allowing the MDS to deploy the antenna. For
launch, the spoke assemblies are-eaCh preloaded to 378 N (85 lb) and this preload is reacted
by two pin-socket combinations caIled'ilae mid-point-res_aint (inset, Figure 8). Both pins are
titanium 6A1-4V with spherical ends that engage the sockets. The pin receptacle design is
shown in Figure 9. One receptacle is a cone, the other is a V-groove, they both have included
angles of 90 degrees, and they areboth made from incond "718. The reason for the different
receptacle designs was to avoid multiple load paths in case the pins did not have the exact
same separation as the receptacles. The two receptacles balance the tension from the spoke
preload, the cone locates the rib in the plane of the receptacles, and the V-groove reacts any
rotation about the cone receiStacte. The tip restraint of the ribs is a pin (shown in Figure 6) in
a tuning-fork-like receptacle. ]'_his design prevents rotatio-n_s o-f the ribs about their mid.point
restraints and allows the ribs to i'iaoW _ut freely during deployfi'i_nt.
Antenna Transportation l_J[ist_
The antenna was built ai the I-IA_!_ _ocp0ration in _leibi_iime, Florida. The ribs
were then stowed with the launch preload of 378 N (85 Ib) and shipped by ground
transportation to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in California. The shipping method
supported the antenna by its flight interface horizontally (cantilevered) in the shipping
container. The antenna was tested at JPL and then shipped by ground transport to Kennedy
Space Center (KSC) for launch in May 1986. The Challenger disaster prevented Galileo
from launching in 1986, and so the spacecraft and anteiana Were returned to JPL. The flight
antenna was again returned to KSC for launch in October i989.
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Figure 10.
Galileo Mission Timeline
Galileo Flight History and the Deployment Anomaly
The Galileo mission timeline is shown in Figure 10. The spacecraft was launched on
October 18, 1989 and during the launch sequence, the Central Release Mechanism on the
HGA was actuated. Telemetry from the spacecraft indicated that the CRM had released
properly. The antenna was left in the stowed position so it would not be damaged by the
intense sunlight during the early portion of the mission when Galileo would be at sun relative
distances of less than one astronomical unit. The spacecraft reached Venus for a gravity
assist on February 10, 1990 and then swung around for another gravity assist at Earth on
December 8, 1990. This put Galileo on a trajectory that would bring it around for a third and
final gravity assist at Earth on December 8, 1992. By April 1991 the spacecraft had reached a
point in its mission where it would no longer be thermally risky to deploy the HGA. On
April 11, 1991 Galileo executed a sequence to open the High Gain Antenna. The sequence
energized the HGA deployment motors (both motors on the Dual Drive Actuator) for eight
minutes. A nominal deployment time would have been about 165 seconds with both motors
on the DDA operating properly. The deployment time, if one motor/gear train had failed,
would have been about 330 seconds. When the antenna reached the fully deployed position,
a set of redundant microswitches would have shut down power to the drive motors. The
sequence was set to operate the motors for eight minutes to protect the motors from
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overheating(if stalled)andto allowenoughtimefor asinglemotoroperatingatcold
temperatureto fully deploytheantenna.Themotorcurrenttelemetryreceivedfrom the
spacecraftis shownin Figure11. The current drawn by the motors started higher than
expected andcontinued to rise until it leveled off 56 seconds after ioitiation.
The other telemetry significaat to the anomaly r_¢ivecl from Galileo during the HGA
deploy attempt are a spike inthe Spin Detector output (Figure 12), a reduction in the output
of the Sun GateaLcertain clock angles (Figure 13), a d_e.cre_ in the spin rate, and an
increase inthe wobble of the spacecraft. The
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Sun Gate Output vs, Clock Angle
Spin Dete.ctor is a_very sensitive accelerometer
mountedon the spinning portion of the
sp_acecraft, T_S sensor is used to detect the
spin rate. of t_ spacecraft, At eight seconds
after tl_. star___o.fthe_deployment, a sudden
acceleration occurred and produced the Spin
Detector output spike shown in Figure 12.
Figure_ 13 shows.the output of the Sun Gate
after the deploy attempt. The Sun Gate is a
detector that is used to protect the spacecraft
from exceeding an angle of 15 degrees
between the sun and Galileo's long axis. This
was necessary to protect the Galileo during the
portion of the mission when it was close to the
sun. During the HGA deploy attempt, the Sun
Gate output dropped at a spacecraft clock angle
of 265 degrees, The clock angle is an angular position measurement on the spacecraft with
the origin at the rotational center of Galileo and in a plane perpendicular to the HGA long
axis. Also, the decrease in spinrate was not enough for a fully, deployed antenna (due to the
increase in the ant enna's moment of inertia) and the reason for the increase in wobble was not
initially understood.
DATA ANALYSIS
The first conclusion that can be drawn from the Sun Gate data is that the output was
reduced by the shadow of an antenna rib. Analysis of the Sun Gate's location with respect to
the antenna shows that only one rib can shadow the Sun Gate and that this rib can only
shadow it at deployment angles of 34 to 43 degrees given the spacecraft-to-sun angle at the
time of the deploy attempt (5,39 degrees). Analysis of the amount of obscuration of the Sun
Gate indicatedthat the one rib that Can shadow the Sun Gate was deployed about 35 degrees
from its stowed position.
The motor current telemetry indicated that the motors stalled at 56 seconds after
initiation. The telemetrL_ w_s then used to dqtermine bow far the ballscrew in the Mechanical
Drive System had rotated from the_stowed position, The motors on the DDA are brushless dc
motors. The DDA, therefore, has the speed-torque-current relationship shown in Figure 14.
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.. Torque vs. Ballscrew Revolutions
for the High Gain Antenna Deployment Anomaly
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This allows the expression of speed as a function of current. Utilizing this relationship, the
current telemetry from the spacecraft, and integrating over time allowed the determination of
the ballscrew position as a function of time. Taking into account the granularity of the
current telemetry, converting the current telemetry to torque, and plotting this as a function of
ballscrew revolutions resulted in the curve shown in Figure 15. The data indicates that the
ballscrew rotated just over five turns. (A full deployment requires 25 rotations of the
ballscrew.) Converting the five rotations to carrier movement and then to rib rotation
indicates that the ribs could not have deployed to an angle greater than 11 degrees, which is
inconsistent with the Sun Gate data. The way the ribs are connected to the carder allows for
an asymmetric deployment of the ribs if one or more ribs are restrained by something. After
several tests on the spare antenna, it was determined that the most likely configuration of the
antenna was three ribs restrained at their stowed position, his would allow the opposite rib
(over the Sun Gate) to deploy to the position indicated by the Sun Gate data. Also, the
number of ballscrew revolutions and the torque required to deploy the antenna under these
conditions is consistent with the current telemetry. Figure 16 is a photograph of the spare
antenna in the three restrained rib configuration. This asymmetrical configuration is also
consistent with the amount of reduction in the spin rate and the increase in wobble.
The Spin Detector spike occurred at a time in the deployment that coincided with an
increase in torque for the DDA. The initial thinking that the spike was due to the release of
some other restrained ribs was not consistent with the increase in torque required from the
drive system.
After the shape of the antenna was determined, the design was dissected to find what
could possibly be holding the ribs in the stowed position. Four possibilities survived this
analysis. They were:
1. The tip shade (sunshade mounted on the tip of the antenna to protect it during the
early part of the flight) snagged in the wire mesh.
2. Restraint of the Mechanical Drive System (MDS).
3. Retention of the rib tips in their tuning-fork-like sockets.
4. Retention of the ribs at the mid-point restraint due to friction, cold welding, or
adhesion.
Tests performed on the spare antenna to snag the tip shade were totally unsuccessful.
No configuration of tangling the tip shade in the wire mesh could be found that would
restrain the ribs at the stowed position. All attempts resulted in significant rotation of the
restrained ribs from the stowed position, allowing a much greater number of ballscrew
revolutions before stalling the Dual Drive than indicated by the current telemetry.
Restraint of the MDS was eliminated due to the order in which testing and assembly
occurred at Kennedy Space Center. The area around the MDS was closed and no longer
368
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accessible prior to several deploy tests of the flight antenna. Also, this area was not
accessible during installation of the antenna on the spacecraft.
Retention of the rib tips in their tuning-fork sockets was very unlikely due to the pre-
launch testing that had been performed. The tuning forks would have to have been damaged
after the final deployment test or in flight. A failure of this type would also cause a slower
increase in the torque required from the DDA (due to the stiffness of the ribs) during the
deploy attempt than was indicated by the current telemetry. This left as the first choice of
failure the mid-point restraint pins and sockets. If friction was responsible for restraining the
pins, it would require a coefficient of friction greater than one.
The next mystery was how the MDS and the structure were able to carry the load
generated by the stalled motors. The Dual Drive stall torque output during the deploy attempt
z,oz_r, was about 6.33 N-m (56 in-lb). A test
(s eL)
was performed on a mock-up of the
(, MDS to determine how it would
respond to the odd loading condition
Ot_L ORIVt ACTUATOR-_ t_-ACTUATOA SUPPORT
\(_ PL_ created by the antenna. The test fixture
ST,iU'IDOFF
(3p_ t/ shown in Figure 17 was used to apply
moment, axial, and shear loads to the
-_ "carder plate" individually and in
LSCRtW I' t combination. The results of these testsIll showed that shear and axial loads do not
_:'_"_'_--__'_"_'_""_'_ "_"'_ -_ _ L/ _1_ significantly affect the efficiency of a"t _ -- ballscrew. Moment loads, however,
tOLl result in very significant losses in a,_=,.:,._,::]l_ i ! ballscrew/ballnut assembly. The graphs
i___ in Figure 18 show that the application of
a moment of 339 N-m (3000 in-lb) to a
! ",_'m,_cE_Nr /_ ballnut results in torque losses of 4.18
(, _L) N-m (37 in-lb), or more than half of the
uNa_,_ available torque from the DDA. This
large amount of torque loss is due to
L_ LOAD jamming of the balls in the baUnut and
Figure 17. sliding contact of the ballscrew with the
Mechanical Drive System ballnut body. Also, it was found that
Loading _ture further losses occurred at the lower
bearing housing (see Figure 5), due to the sliding contact of the ballscrew with the stationary
outer housing. The needle roller bearing in the lower housing is not capable of supporting a
large moment load, allowing the ballscrew to rotate relative to the housing and come in
contact with it. The result of these torque losses was that very little torque was available to
move the ribs against their restraints.
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RECOVERY TECHNIQUES AND ATTEMPTS
The first suggestion made to get the antenna open was to restow it and try the
deployment again. The Dual Drive Actuator, although capable of bi-directional operation,
was not wired on the spacecraft to stow the antenna. This operation required human
assistance to roll the wire mesh in order to prevent the mesh from snagging on itself or other
portions of the antenna. Also, it was later learned through ground testing on the spare
antenna that the lower bearing housing torque losses increase every time the antenna is
stowed and redeployed, resulting in less and less DDA torque available to overcome the rib
restraint. This increase in torque losses is due to the rotating steel ballscrew galling the
stationary aluminum housing. The galling changes the surface finish of the aluminum so
much that the torque required to turn the ballscrew increases. The testing showed that after
just five deploy and stow cycles, the amount that the baUscrew could be rotated from the stow
position was less than half the original amount of five revolutions.
The first attempt at breaking loose the antenna was to rotate the spacecraft away from
the sun and then toward the sun. The thermal expansion and contraction of the antenna
structure would be much greater than the expansion of the ribs and would cause a significant
change in the forces at the mid-point restraints. A computer analysis of the pin-socket joints
indicated that after several (4 to 6) thermal cycles of the antenna, the pins might come out of
the sockets due to infinitesimal sliding each time the forces changed from the temperature
cycle. This analysis assumed friction was holding the pins in the sockets. After seven
thermal turns, there was no indication that the rib pins were "walking" out of their sockets.
The next recovery technique used was to swing the LGA-2 and impart a shock to the
spacecraft structure. The LGA-2 swings 145 degrees at about five RPM and then hits a hard
stop. The Low Gain Antenna-2 mast is approximately 2 meters long with the low gain
antenna mounted on the end. The moment of inertia of this assembly is very large and
imparts a significant impulse to the spacecraft structure. The LGA-2 was swung six times
with no results.
The final recovery technique tried to date was to pulse the HGA Dual Drive motors at
1.25 and 1.875 Hertz. It was found during testing that the Dual Drive Actuator has a mode of
oscillation that is due to the coupling of the motor armature inertia and the gearbox stiffness.
The result of this mode is that the DDA can produce a pulsing torque at the output shaft that
is forty percent greater than the stall torque value. When the pulsing was performed on a
DDA in the spare High Gain Antenna, the antenna also responded at the same frequencies.
The combination of the DDA and the antenna was able to turn the ballscrew another 1.5
revolutions beyond the stall point. This significantly increased the force on the mid-point
restraint pins to a pullout force of 18 N (4 Ib) and a shear force of 213 N (48 lb). These
forces were high enough to elastically deform the ribs and pull them out of the bottom of the
tuning-fork receptacles if they had been restrained there. The forces applied to the ribs on the
Galileo spacecraft, after completion of the DDA pulsing, conclusively eliminate the tip
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fittings asapossiblesourceof restraint.The ribs are therefore restrained at the mid-point
restraints.
PIN AND SOCKET ANALYSIS
Several pin and socket pairs were removed from the spare HGA for evaluation and
testing. [2l The spare HGA had been through a significant amount of vibration testing, which
causes relative motion between the pins and sockets. The sockets were made of Inconel 718
with a surface finish of 0.2 microns RMS (8 micro inch RMS). The pins were made from
titanium 6AI-4V and were finished with the Tiodize type II and the Tiolube 460 processes.
These processes consist of putting an anodize coating on the titanium and following this with
a molybdenum disulfide coating for dry lubrication.
A conical socket and its associated pin are shown in Figure 19. The contact area on the
conical receptacle shows a transfer of some drylube from the pin, which was expected. The
surface shows no indications of damage of any kind. The surface of the pin also shows no
damage. There is a barely visible ring on the spherical surface where the pin made line
contact with its receptacle. The Hertzian contact stresses on this surface were well within the
operating capability of the pin and its surface coatings.
Figure 19.
Cone Socket and Pin
A V-groove socket and its mating pin are shown in Figure 20. These are from the same
rib as the cone and pin shown in Figure 19. The surface of the pin is plastically deformed to
a flat spot, as shown by the arrow. Although X-ray diffraction scans of the surface show the
presence of MoS2 on the contact area, scans of some other pins from other ribs showed no
presence of MoS2 on their contact patches. This indicates that the deformation of the surface
destroyed the Tiolube and Tiodize coatings. The contact stresses actually exceeded the
capability of the pin coatings by about five times. A higher magnification of the upper spot
on the V-groove receptacle in Figure 20 is shown in Figure 21. The surface has been
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Figure 20.
V-Groove Socket and Pin
Figure 21.
Magnification of Upper Spot
on V-Groove Socket in Figure 20
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deformed and worn away. Scans of the contact surface on the receptacle show a large
amount of Ti 6AI-4V, indicating a transfer of base material from the titanium pin.
A series of tests was performed at NASA Lewis Research Center on the friction
properties of drylubed and bare titanium against Inconel 718. [3] The results of these tests
showed that if the two surfaces are displaced relative to each other under load and in air, then
displaced relative to each other under load in a vacuum, the sliding friction between the
surfaces increases nearly ten times. When a drylubed and anodized pin was operated in an
atmosphere, the drylube surface was quickly destroyed and, as a result, exposed the base
titanium. The testing also showed that with an atmosphere present to continue to react with
the bare titanium as it was worn by sliding contact, the friction coefficient never exceeded
0.35. However, once a pin's drylube was damaged by operation in air and then operated in a
vacuum, the surfaces started to gall and produce coefficients of friction in excess of 1.0.
RIB RETENTION MECHANISM
The first time the ribs were stowed to their full preload, plastic deformation of the
contact points on the V-groove pins destroyed the ceramic coating on the titanium that was
the bonding surface for the drylube material. During the four trips across the country the
antenna was exposed to enough of a vibration environment to cause relative motion between
the pins and sockets. This motion was amplified by the cantilever mounting of the antenna in
its shipping container. The pins that were on the top and bottom (with the antenna
horizontal) saw the greatest amount of relative motion with respect to their sockets. Since
this occurred in an atmosphere, the drylube surfaces on the pins were worn. During vibration
testing of the antenna at JPL, further damage to the drylube occurred. The vibration testing
was done along the same axis as the gravity vector during ground transport, causing the same
pins and sockets to experience the greatest amount of relative motion. By launch, the drylube
was probably completely worn off the contact points between the pins and V-groove sockets.
After launch, the spacecraft was exposed to a vibration environment from the upper stage that
caused more relative motion of the pins and sockets. Since this occurred in a vacuum with
bare titanium pins (due to the destruction of the contact patch on the V-groove receptacles),
the pins and sockets galled together requiring more force to deploy the ribs than can be
generated by the MDS.
Also, several other ribs spaced around the antenna were stuck by this same mechanism
at the start of the deployment. Since the ballscrew did not have a large moment applied to it
due to the spacing of the ribs, the ballscrew generated enough force to eject most of the ribs
(which explains the acceleration detected by the Spin Detector). When the only ribs
remaining stuck were on one side of the antenna, the ballscrew moment started increasing
significantly, increasing the torque losses in the drive system. The increased losses, coupled
with the reduction of force at the pins and sockets on the remaining stuck ribs, ended up
stalling the DDA before the forces were large enough to eject the last three ribs.
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Thefailuremechanismrequiresaspecialsetof circumstancesin a specificorderto
causethedeploymentanomaly.Theeventsnecessaryto producethefailureof theGalileo
HGA aresummarized,in therequiredorderof sequence,below:
1. Generateahighenoughcontactstressto plasticallydeformthetitaniumpinsand
breaktheceramiccoatingthatwasusedto bondthedrylube.
2. Producerelativemotionbetweenthepinsandsocketsin anatmosphereto remove
thedamagedcoatinganddrylubefrom thecontactareasandto producea rough
surfaceonthematingparts.
3. Producerelativemotionbetweenthepinsandsocketsin avacuumto removethe
oxidizedandcontaminatedtitaniumfrom thesurfaceof thepins andthengall
bothpartssothefriction isveryhigh.
4, Produceanasymmetricdeploymentof theribssothattheballscrewhasa large
momentappliedto it andcannotproducetheforcenecessaryat themid-point
restraintto ejecttheribs.
Without the relative motion of the pins and sockets in a vacuum, (number 3 above) the
lower coefficient of friction of the interface in air allowed all ground deployment tests of the
antenna to be perfectly successful due to the V-groove socket internal angle of 90 degrees.
As long as there is an atmosphere to react with any free titanium generated by any relative
motion, the friction between the pins and sockets is maintained at a value that will not
prevent the antenna from deploying. Also, a vacuum deployment test without the relative
motion of the parts in the vacuum, would also be successful due to the oxides and
contaminants on the bare titanium pins. A vacuum deployment of the flight antenna was
done and was successful because of the lack of relative motion between the pins and sockets
in the vacuum.
CONCLUSIONS
The high contact stresses on the V-groove pin/socket interfaces destroyed the integrity
of the lubricant film and started the chain of events that led to the deployment anomaly. The
conical sockets and pins were exposed to all of the same environments as the V-groove
sockets and pins, but the lubricant surface was not breached. A low enough friction level was
maintained such that the conical sets did not inhibit the antenna deployment. The main
difference between the cone sockets and V-groove sockets is the contact stress level.
The use of drylube, specifically molybdenum disulfide, on a mechanism that is going to
be operated in an atmosphere should be carefully evaluated. The wear rate of the MoS2 in air
is so much higher than in a vacuum that any coatings could be worn out by in-air testing and
not provide the desired lubrication when needed. The pins and sockets on the HGA that
received the greatest amount of relative motion due to the shipping method were the same
ones that were exercised most by the vibration testing. These are also the same pins and
sockets that are stuck on the spacecraft. One solution to the problem of ambient testing
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wearing out the lubricant coating would be to replace the lubricated components just prior to
launch so there is a virgin lubricant surface for the flight operation.
The failure of the Galileo HGA was not detectable with in-air testing, due to the choice of
titanium for the pin material. Since this material reacts with oxygen so readily, the in-air
friction change, due to the damaged surfaces, was not detectable because the higher friction
coefficient (0.35 vs. 0.05) was not high enough to be restrained by the 90 degree included
angle of the receptacles. As a result, more deployment tests in air would only have worn out
the drive system. Also, the vacuum deployment test of the flight antenna did not exhibit this
failure mode due to the lack of pin and socket relative motion. The test conditions were not
adequate for finding this problem, indicating that just a functional test in vacuum is not always
appropriate.
EPILOGUE
Although the Galileo spacecraft has no operating high gain antenna, workarounds using
the Low Gain Antenna ( LGA-1 ), new data compression techniques, and the spacecraft's
recorder have been developed that will meet 70 percent of the mission objectives (Reference 4).
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